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Notes
IMPLIED POWERS OF THE CORPORATE PRESIDENT
As nearly every phase of modem day business is largely conducted
by private corporations, it is of the utmost importance to members of
the public to know to what extent they can safely rely upon the power
of corporate officers to bind the corporation m relation to ordinary
business transactions. Perhaps, the one officer whose power and
authority is most disputed is the president of the corporation. Un-
doubtedly the popular understanding concerning the power of the
corporate president is found in Pegram-West Inc. v Winston Mut. Life
Ins. Co., a recent North Carolina decision.' In that case the plaintiff
corporation was engaged in the sale of lumber and building materials.
Defendant corporation was in the business of issuing contracts and
policies of insurance and making loans secured bv real estate. One
Dixon advised plaintiff that defendant was making him a loan on a
proposed building and that the defendant would pay for all materials
used in construction thereof. The plaintiff contacted defendant and
the latter, acting by and through its president and manager, agreed
to pay plaintiff for such material as was furnished for use in the build-
ing to be constructed by Dixon. Plaintiff furnished materials as agreed
for a time. Subsequently, however, defendant renounced any further
responsibility for materials furnished and refused to pay for certain
items supplied prior to such declaration. In the resulting suit by
plaintiff, the court rendered judgment against defendant. Concerning
the power of defendant's president to act for the corporation, the
court stated: "The president of a corporation is ex vi termini its head
and general agent, and, nothing else appearing, may act for it in the
business in which it is authorized to engage." It was further stated,
" it is sufficient to say that some affirmative action by the stock-
holder or directors of the corporation in meetings duly called and
held, would be required to restrict the general authority vested in the
president to act for the corporation."
2
A detailed examination ofthe judicial authorities reveals that there
are two opposing theories with reference to the implied powers of the
president of a business corporation, one of which conforms to the
popular understanding stated in the above case and ascribes to him,
1231 N.C. 277, 56 S.E. 2d 607 (1949).
Id. at - 56 S.E. 2d at 612-13.
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prima facie, the powers of its ordinary business agent,3 and the other
of which denies to him any power whatever to bind it as its contracting
agent, unless that power is specially conferred by the board of direc-
tors.4 The judicial pendulum swings with a marked degree of incon-
sistency between these two extremes. It is difficult to deduce a general
principle from the cases in which the power of the corporate president
is in issue, since the decision in any particular case is dependent upon
which attitude the court adopts with respect to the widely divergent
theories and on the fact situation involved. To show the extent of this
divergence, it is proposed to throw into contrast passages from two
judicial opinions. In 1Vait v Nashua Armory Ass n where architects
were employed by the president of the corporation, who assumed
to act in its behalf, the court said:
"The evidence for the plaintiffs simply tended to show that they were
employed by the president to prepare plans and specifications for the
proposed armory, and that he assumed to act for the corporation, but
there was no evidence that the corporation in any way authonzed
him to procure such plans and specifications, nor was there any
evidence of such authority on his part from any source unless it
could be implied from his office. But no such authority is incident to
the office. The directors, and not the president, have the powers of the
corporation, and exercise an original, rather than a delegated, author-
ity. and the president has no implied authority, as such, to act as the
agent of the corporation, but, like other agents, he must derive his
power from the board of directors, or from the corporation."
In the case of Steam Boat Co. v McCutcheon & Collins, where the
president leased an office for the corporation, it was said by the court:
'Cotton States Belting & Supply Co. v. Florida Ry., 69 Fla. 52, 67 So. 568
(1915); Baker v. Lowe Electric Co., 47 Ga. App. 259, 170 S.E. 337 (1933);
Bloom v. Nathan Vehon Co., 341 Ill. 200, 173 N.E. 270 (1930); Sherman Center
Tovn Co. v. Swvigart, 43 Kan. 292, 23 P 569 (1890); Kentucky Tobacco Assn
v. Ashby, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 109 (1879); Stevens Davis Co. v. Sid's Petroleum Corp.,
157 S.W 2d 246 (Mo. App. 1942); Mayger v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co.,
68 Mont. 492, 219 Pac. 1102 (192.3); Bintz v. Mid-City Park Corp., 22.3 App.
Div. 533, 229 N.Y. Supp. 390 (1928); Meating v. Tigerton Lumber Co., 113 Wis.
379, 89 N.W 152 (1902).
'Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. City Council, 114 Ala. 433,, 21 So.
960 (1897); Homesteaders Life Assn v. Salinger, 212 Iowa 250, 235 N.W 485
(1931); Kelly v. Citizens Finance Co., 306 Mass. 531, 28 N.E. 2d 1005 (1940);
Knopf v. Alma Park Inc., 105 N.J. Eq. 299, 147 Adt. 590 (1929); Harding v.
Oregon-Idaho Co., 57 Ore. 34, 110 Pae. 412 (1910); Prairie Lea Production Co.
v. Lincoln Tank Co., 294 S.W 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Crown Paving &
Construction Co. v. Walla Walla County, 122 Wash. 144, 210 Pac. 357 (1922);
Varney & Evans v. Hutcinson Lumber & Mfg. Co., 70 W Va. 169, 73 S.E. 321
(1911). Note that some courts have gone so far, on one hand, as to take judicial
notice of the ordinary powers of the president [Ceeder v. Loud & Sons Lumber Co.,
86 Mich. 541 (1891)], while various courts have denied to him, on the other
hand, any ex officio power except that of presiding over the board of directors.
[Lyndon Mill Co. v. Lynrdon Literary Inst., 63 Vt. 581 (1891)].
66 N.H. 581, 23 Ad. 77, 78 (1891).
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"Who, then, was the proper person to make the contract? Certainly,
the president. We must bear in mind that these lands of artificial
men, or persons, are becoming very common in this State. The legis-
lature turn them out almost as rapidlv as a miller does his grist. They
compose a new element, or ingredient, of modem society. They con-
tract with everybody, and about all manner of things; and they can
contract by their chief officers; and such is their usual course of busi-
ness. The president of a company presents himself to make a contract,
evidently connected with the business. He declares the object and
purpose of the contract. Who doubts him? We are a dealing people.
Is he asked to produce the charter and the books of the company to
show that he is authorized to make the contract secundum artem?
Such is not-the custom."
The decided lack of uniformity found throughout the various juris-
dictions has resulted, to a certain extent, from the fact that in many
instances there are no provisions in either statutes or charters indi-
cating the scope of the president's authority Typically, the by-laws
simply give the president power to preside at meetings, to supervise
the operations of the corporation and to perform the functions of a
president. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the by-laws to ex-
pressly provide that the president shall be the general manager, the
result being that in various decisions it is difficult to determine what
powers the court considers to be in the president solely because he is
president.
A slight majority of the states7 take the view that the president's
power to act for the corporation is dependent upon the authority
granted to him, either by the charter or by the stockholders or di-
rectors. At one time this was the only rule prevailing. In these states
the president may, of course, be expressly given the general manage-
ment of the corporation or he may be expressly authorized to do par-
13 Pa. St. 13, 15 (1850).
The following states are the ones most consistently holding to the mew that
the president has no greater power than any other director: ARK., Dent v. People s
Bank of Imboden, 118 Ark. 157, 175 S.W 1154 (1915); IND., State ex rel.
Guaranty Building & Loan Co. v. Wiley, 100 Ind. App. 438, 196 N.E. 153 (1935)
semble; MASS., Horowitz v. State St. Trust Co., 283 Mass. 53, 186 N.E. 74
(1933); MINN., Grant v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry. Co., 66 Minn. 349, 69 N.W 23
(1896); N.H., Hillard v. Upper Coos R.R., 77 N.H. 129, 88 AUt. 993 (1913);
OHIO, Kroeger v. Brody, 130 Ohio St. 559, 200 N.E. 836 (1936); OKLA.,
McMahan & Co. v. Hibbard, 182 Okla. 503, 78 P 2d 409 (1937) semble; ORE.,
Wilson v.-Investment Co., 80 Ore. 233, 156 Pac. 249 (1916); PA., Kelly, Murray,
Inc. v. Lansdowne Bank & Trust Co., 299 Pa. 236, 149 AUt. 190 (1930); TENN.,
Nickey Bros. v. Lonsdale Mfg. Co., 149 Tenn. 391, 258 S.W 776 (1924); TEX.,
El Fresnal Irrigated Land Co. v. Bank of Washington, 182 S.W 701 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916); UTAH, Copper King Mimng Co. v. Hanson, 52 Utah 605, 176 Pac.
623 (1918); VT., Goodenough s Adm x. v. Vermont-Peoples Nat. Bank, 106 Vt.
5, 168 Atl. 914 (1933) semble; WASH., Lawiston 'ater & Power Co. v. Brown,
42 Wash. 555, 85 Pac. 47 (1906); W VA., Kelly Convertible Wagon Co. v. Rhodes
Mfg. Co., 102 WVa. 16, 135 S.E. 242 (1926). Note that the states in which
corporate enterprise has been less prevalent have clung to the older view that
there is no authority in the president by virtue of his office to bind the corporation.
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ticular acts such as make stipulated contracts, borrow money execute
mortgages, or to execute conveyances. Not only that, but the president
may be clothed with apparent authority to act for the corporation, as
where it allows him habitually to do certain acts or to manage the
business generally although no authority has been expressly given to
lhm. In such cases, the acts of the president are binding upon the
corporation, provided the third party has relied upon such apparent
authority In the absence of these elements of authority however, the
president is treated as a mere figurehead whose sole duty is to preside
at directors meetings. The fact that he occupies the office of president
of a corporation does not confer upon him any greater authority than
that possessed by any other director.8
The rule stated in many jurisdictions9 is that if the president is
given general control and supervision over the affairs of the corpora-
tion, it will be presumed that he has authority to make contracts and
do acts with the course of its ordinary business. At the turn of the
century only a few states had adopted such a view However, the
Cases cited supra note 6. Not all the states follow any clear course. Some
states have taken no stand on the question. The following states have cases which
appear to take the liberal view as well as cases which seem to adhere to the more
narrow rule. ALA. (reverse cases), Brush Electric Light & Power Co. of Mont-
gomery v. City Council of Montgomery, 114 Ala. 443, 21 So. 960 (1897). But cf.
Naveo Hardwood Co. v. Bass, 214 Ala. 553, 108 So. 452 (1925); CAL., Walker
v. Kimball Fruit Co., Inc., 283 Pac. 895 (Cal. App. 1929). Contra: Padgham v.
Invo Marble Co., 116 Cal. App. 328, 2 P. 2d 531 (1931); IOWA, White v. Elgin
Creamery Co., 108 Iowa 522, 79 N.W 283 (1899). But cf. Homesteaders Life
Ass n v. Salinger, 212 Iowa 2.51, 235 N.W 485 (1931); LA., sec. Slagle v. Peyton,
182 La. 358, 162 So. 12 (1935). Contra: Massman v. Lousiana Mfg. Cooperage
Co., 177 La. 999, 149 So. 886 (1933) semble; MICH., Melvindale State Bank v.
Eckfield, 283 Mich. 179, 277 N.W 876 (1938). Contra: Jacob v. Gratiot Central
Market Co., 267 Mich. 262, 255 N.W 331 (1934); NEV., Ex parte Rickey, 31
Nev. 82, 100 Pac. 134 (1909). But cf. Reno Water Co. v. Leete, 17 Nev. 203, 30
Pac. 702 (1882); N.J., Tback v. Elevator Supplies Co., Inc., 118 N.J. Eq. 90, 177
Afl. 458 (1935). Contra: Knopf v. Alma Park, Inc., 105 N.J. Eq. 299, 147 AUt.
590 (1929).
' It seems probable, but not certain, that the following states would adhere
to the liberal view of inherent authority- DEL., Italo-Petroleum Corp. of America
v. Hanmgan, 14 A. 2d 401 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940); FLA., Miami Jockey Club v.
Lillias Piper, Inc., 115 Fla. 612, 155 So. 806 (1934); GA., Newton v. Social Circle
Cotton Mill Co., 174 Ga. 320, 162 S.E. 667 (1932) semble; ILL., Bloom v. Nathan
Vehon Co., 341 ll. 200, 173 N.E. 270 (1930); Kan., Childress v. Lucky Jew Lead
& Zinc Co., 134 Kan. 743, 8 P 2d 376 (1932); KY., Ross v. Eagle Coal Co., 237
Ky. 660, 36 S.W 2d 48 (1931); MD., Conservation Co. v. Stimpson, 136 Md. 314,
110 AUt. 495 (1920) semble; MO., Shumake v. Basic Metale Mimng Corp., 129
S.W 2d 36 (Mo. App. 1939); MONT., Bingham v. National Bank of Mont., 105
Mont. 159, 72 P 2d 90 (1937)" NEB., Omaha Wool & Storage Co. v. Chicago
W By., 97 Neb. 50, 149 N.W 55 (1914); N.Y., Schwartz v. United Merchants
& Mfg., 72 F 2d 2.56 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934); N.C., White v. Johnson & Sons, Inc.,
205 N.C. 773, 172 S.E. 370 (1934); N.D., Farmers State Bank of Richardton v.
Brown, 52 N.D. 806, 204 N.W 673 (1925); VA., Richmond, F & P. R.R. v.
Snead & Smith, 60 Va. 354 (1869); WIS., Kline v. Thompson, 206 Wis. 464, 240
N.W 128 (1932).
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tremendous growth of corporate business, both in size and in compass,
in the past fifty years, coupled with the emergence of dominating per-
sonalities at the head of many corporations, has resulted in an in-
evitable concentration of executive power in the corporate president.
The result has been that an ever-increasing number of states have
broken away from the early rules laid down when corporations were
few in number. The ]urisdictions which have cast aside the older view
have based their decisions upon two different theories. Some courts
state that there is a rebuttable presumption of authority to perform
any act within the general scope of the company s business. 1° Other
jurisdictions have taken a broader view in holding that the president
has the authority to do anything the directors could authorize.ii
Just how much proof is needed to rebut a prima facie case when
the president has acted beyond his actual authority has not been de-
termined m most jurisdictions. On one hand, it may be held that the
corporation must show an actual denial of authority 12 At the other
extreme, it might be that a mere showing that the president had not
been granted such authority would be sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion. The solution seems to lie somewhere between these two extremes.
The former seems to be unnecessarily strict and could curb corporate
presidents sharply since the corporation, as a precautionary measure
to avoid liability would place affirmative curtailments upon the author-
ity of its president. The latter is undesirable in that it would work a
hardship on the party dealing with the corporation in virtually every
case.
In the ]urlsdictions which have adopted the liberal and modern
rule, it has been held that the president has the implied power to make
ordinary sales, in the course of business, of the goods or commodities
in which the corporation deals;13 to pay a broker for affecting sales,
which the president hinself has the power to make, of the goods in
which the corporation deals;' 4 to take a conveyance of land to himself
upon foreclosure of a mortgage held by the corporate bank m an at-
"0 It is difficult to say just what is meant by the "general scope of the com-
pany s business," or whether in such a case the president occupies a position
putting hun in the class with general managers. Knopf v. Alma Park, Inc., 105
N.J. Eq. 299, 147 Adt. 590 (1929).
'Adams v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 73 F 2d 975 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934). Note
that under the former theory, third persons are protected only in ordinary situations
where they would be likely to expect the president to be acting with authority
while the latter view affords protection in all cases where he could conceivably be
acting with authority.
' See Newbold v. Brennan Constr. Co., 48 App. D.C. 90, 94 (1918); Omaha
Wool & Storage Co. v. Chicago Great W By., 97 Neb. 50, 149 N.W 55 (1914).
'Horton Ice-Cream Co. v. Merritt, 63 Hun. (N.Y.) 628, 17 N.Y. Supp. 718
(1892).
'x Northern Central Ry. v. Bastian, 15 Md. 494 (1860).
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tempt to save a debt due the corporation - and his estate will be pro-
tected against consequent loss;15 to employ counsel m behalf of the
corporation and to direct litigation m which it is interested; 16 to pur-
chase chattels used in the ordinary course of business;17 and to arrange
to renew a debt due the corporate bank. s It should be kept in mind
that, under the opposing theory already referred to, there is a con-
trary judicial authority on nearly everyone of the preceding points.
Irrespective of what powers a president of a corporation may be
presumed to have, even the jurisdictions adhering to the more liberal
and modem view admit that there are certain things he cannot do
without special authority from the directors. For example, the presi-
dent, m the absence of express authority, cannot bind the corporation
on a secret agreement to pay an employee an unusually large annual
salary 19 He cannot employ a person to procure a loan of a large sum
of money on commission, -' nor may he engage a physician to treat an
employee whose illness did not arise out of the business of -the corpora-
tion.2' The president has no power to purchase real property for the
corporation;--'2 to borrow money m the name of the corporation and
pledge its responsibility;2 3 or assign its assets as security therefore;
2 4
in the case of a railroad company to grant trackage rights over cor-
porate land for 999 years;2 to agree to give stock in the corporation
to an employee m payment of wages; 26 to bmd a company to pay an
employee a bonus based on percentage of company s profits;2 7 to
mortgage or pledge personal property of the corporation; 28 to bind
the corporation by mere contract of guaranty m which the corporation
has no apparent interest;20 to make a gift of corporate property;30 or
" Bro wn v. Mechanics & Traders Nat. Bank, 58 Hun. (N.Y.) 610, 12 N.Y.
Supp. 861 (1st Dep't 1890).
"Bankers Trust Co. v. Cooper, 179 S.W 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
"Sparks v. Despatch Transfer Co., 104 Mo. 531, 15 S.W 417 (1891).
"Cake v. Pottsville Bank, 116 Pa. St. 264, 9 Ati. 302 (1887).
Mayhew v. Budd Mfg. Co., 258 Mich. 381, 242 N.W 737 (1932).
Tobin v. Roanng Creek & C. R.R., 86 Fed. 1020 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1898).
' Donohue v. Nash Sales Corp., Inc., 5 N.J. Misc. R. 692, 137 AtI. 891 (Sup.
Ct. 1927).
"' See Blen v. Bear River & A. Water & Min. Co., 20 Cal. 602, 612 (1862).
'See Star Mills v. Bailey, 140 Ky. 194, 196, 130 S.W 1077, 1079 (1910).
' Hyde v. Larkin, 35 Mo. App. 365 (1889).
See Chicago, R. I. & P Ry. v. Union Pac. Ry., 47 Fed. 15, 17 (1891).
Warszawa v. White Eagle Brewing Co., 299 Ill. App. 509, 20 N.E. 2d 343
(1939).
' Noyes v. Irving Trust Co., 250 App. Div. 274, 294 N.Y. Supp. 2 (1st Dep't
1937).
'Webb v. Duvall, 177 Md. 592, 11 A. 2d 446 (1940).
' Atlantic Refining Co. v. Ingalls & Co., 7 W W Harr. 503, 185 Atl. 885
(Del. Super. 1936).
' Henry R. Worthington v. WVorthington, 100 App. Div. 332, 91 N.Y. Supp.
443 (Ist Dep't 1905).
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to segregate corporate funds and constitute them a trust fund for the
benefit of a particular creditor, or to represent that a loan will be paid
out of the sale of certain corporate property and thus give the creditor
an equitable lien upon such proceeds or make him an equitable
assignee. 31 Note that the preceding points all involve matters which
are extraordinary in nature. Thus under the liberal theory, the de-
termnmmg factor concerning the scope of the president's implied
authority appears to be whether or not the particular act is one which
is within the ordinary course of the corporate business. Without ex-
press authority, the president can act and make contracts, binding the
corporation thereby only in the usual course of his duties and the
corporation s business. When he performs an act not incidental to or
pertaining to the usual business of the corporation, it must, as a gen-
eral rule, be proved that such act was duly authorized by the directors.
The jurisdictions adhering to the modern view have, in some in-
stances, reached conflicting results where matters of presidential
authority are concerned. These matters involve those acts on the pqrt
of the president which cannot be termed either ordinary or extra-
ordinary in character with any degree of consistency The courts have
not agreed as to where the line should be drawn in the controversial
area where the "ordinary" acts shade over into the "extraordinary"
category For example, the junsdictions are not agreed as to the im-
plied authority of the president to take or negotiate for a leasehold
interest in property In the main, such authority is dependent upon
the particular circumstances, one of the most important of which is
the character of the business in which the corporation is engaged.
A bus line has been held bound by a lease for a station executed with-
out express authority by the president, in view of the fact that in
executing the lease, he was acting in line with the corporation s busi-
ness and dischargmg for the corporation a duty imposed upon it by
lawful authority 3 2 On the other hand, it has been held that the presi-
dent of a moving picture producing and distributing corporation has
no implied power to negotiate for the leasing or acquisition of
theaters.3 3 Some courts have held the corporate president has no im-
plied authority to enter into contracts of employment or agency,
34
while other jurisdictions have held he has prima facie authority to
make such a contract. 35 The same conflicting views are evident in
"Vogt v. General Necessities Corp., 262 Mich. 409, 247 N.W 707 (1933).
Raleigh Bkg. & T. Co. v. Safety Transit Lines, 198 N.C. 675, 153 S.E. 158
(1930).
Stoneman v. Fox Film Corp., 419 Mass. 295, 4 N.E. 2d 63 (1936).
'Johnson v. Sage, 4 Idaho 758, 44 Pac. 641 (1896).
'Vincent v. S. Alexander Sons Co., 85 Conn. 512, 84 At. 84 (1912).
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cases involving the president's authority to execute negotiable instru-
ments31' or to transfer or indorse commercial paper payable or be-
longing to the corporation.
3 7
From the foregoing material, it is evident that, m regard to the
authority of the corporate president, there is no uniformity from state
to state and the cases m a given state are far too often inconsistent and
irreconcilable in result and language. Not only that, it is difficult in
many instances, in construing the various decisions, to ascertain what
rule the courts intend to lay down, i.e., whether they intend to define
the inherent or implied powers of a president or his powers as general
manager or his apparent powers. It seems impossible therefore, to find
a rational basis for the subject in this country What can be done to
unravel the confusion?
Today when corporations are so common and when so much of the
business of the country is transacted by them, it is high time to break
away from the early rule which practically relegates the president to
the position of a glorified office-boy The cases which uphold the
older view apparently proceed on the theory that the third person
who deals with the president is m a better position to protect himself
than is the corporation. It is felt that because the third person deals
of his own volition with the president, he cannot complain that he was
deceived as to the president's authority in the absence of an investiga-
tion of the authority of the president. From a practical point of view,
however, it seems that third persons who deal with the corporation
president are not in a better position to protect themselves than is the
corporation. The popular view would appear to be that the president
of a corporation has broad power in the absence of notice to the con-
trary The title "president" connotes extensive power. In many cor-
porations, the president is also the general manager and it is doubtful
whether the public is aware of the distinction in powers between the
two offices. One solution to this problem would be for the law to give
any president the status of a general manager and thus invoke the
much broader scope of power of a general manager to bind the cor-
poration than the cases recogize in a mere president. Certainly this
would go far to bring about some uniformity among the jurisdictions
and would give the problem a rational basis by reference to the gen-
eral manager decisions.
As the corporate movement has now outgrown limitations laid
down when corporations were more or less m their infancy, it is ex-
City Elec. St. Ry. v. First Nat. Exch. Bank, 62 Ark. 38, 84 S.W 89 (1896).
Contra: George E. Lloyd & Co. v. Matthews, 223 IMi. 447, 79 N.E. 172 (1906).
' National Bank v. Navassa Phosphate Co., 56 Hun. (N.Y.) 136, 8 N.Y. Supp
929 (1st Dept 1890). Contra: Merrill v. Hurley, 6 S.D. 592, 62 N.W 958 (1895).
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pedient that new principles corresponding with actual corporate prac-
tice be introduced. If the president is the chief executive officer of a
corporation, the courts should take judicial notice of his status without
the necessity of his authority being proven by one who has relied on
it in an ordinary transaction with him. The highly complex business
world of today has cast upon the president new and more extensive
powers which the courts should recogmze as being within an extended
scope of authority In other words, when one s name is put on corpo-
rate stationery as its president, where an office at the principal place
of business has his name on the door with the word "president" added,
and where he appears to be something more than a mere figurehead,
the public should be protected in dealing with him, at least as to the
ordinary everyday business of the corporation.
CuA=s GROMEY
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE RIGHT OF AN OFFICER TO
KILL A FLEEING SUSPECTED FELON
The statement that an officer of the law is justified in killing a
fleeing felon if it is otherwise impossible to prevent his escape appears
frequently in the Kentucky decisions.' The question arises as to
whether the decedent must have been a felon in fact in order to justify
such a homicide. Another way of stating the question is, should an
officer be justified in killing a fleeing innocent person or a mere mis-
demeanant on the officer s proof that he had reasonable cause to be-
lieve his victim was a felon? The issue may arise under two different
circumstances: (1) where no felony has been committed, but the
officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such a cnme had been
committed and that the fleeing person was the suspected felon; (2)
where a felony in fact has been committed, but the officer mistook
the fleeing person for the felon.
The question was treated at length in companion notes, previously
published in the JoxRnNAL,2 wherein opposing views were advocated
and authority cited in support of the respective positions. It is felt that
"The view has been taken that to justify such a killing a major felony must
have been committed. See 88 Ky. L.I. 619 (1950). However, this is not a subject
for treatment herein. For an interesting discussion on the distinction between
major and minor felonies, see Commonwealth v. Emmons, 157. Pa. Super. 495, 48
A. 2d 568 (1945).
'Notes, 88 Ky. L.J. 609 and 88 Ky. L.J. 618 (1950).
